

Department of Economics
2024-2025
Seminar Series



Monday, April 7, 2025
12:30 PM-1:50 PM
SBS, Room N603

Laura Doval

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Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Matching Markets

Abstract: We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they remain unmatched, which we refer to as the agent's conjectures. A collection of conjectures, together with a pairwise stability and individual rationality requirement given the conjectures, defines a solution concept for the economy. We identify a sufficient condition—consistency—for a family of conjectures to lead to a nonempty solution (cf. Hafalir, 2008). As an application, we introduce two families of consistent conjectures and their corresponding solution concepts: continuation-value-respecting dynamic stability, and the extension to dynamic markets of the solution concept in Hafalir (2008), sophisticated dynamic stability. Joint with Pablo Schenone.

All in-person seminars will be held in the Social and Behavioral Sciences Building, Room N603. For additional information, contact the seminar organizers: Profs. Chang Liu & Eva Carceles-Poveda. Visit our webpage for additional information: stonybrook.edu/economics.

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